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Abstract. This work shows that the cryptanalysis of the shrinking gen-
erator requires fewer intercepted bits than that indicated by the linear
complexity. Indeed, whereas the linear complexity of shrunken sequences
is between A·2(S−2) and A·2(S−1), we claim that the initial states of both
component registers are easily computed with less than A · S shrunken
bits. Such a result is proven thanks to the definition of shrunken se-
quences as interleaved sequences. Consequently, it is conjectured that
this statement can be extended to all interleaved sequences. Further-
more, this paper confirms that certain bits of the interleaved sequences
have a greater strategic importance than others, which may be consid-
ered as a proof of weakness of interleaved generators.
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1 Introduction
Stream ciphers are considered nowadays the fastest encryption procedures. Con-
sequently, they are implemented in many practical applications e.g. the algo-
rithms A5 in GSM communications [10], the encryption system E0 in Bluetooth
specifications [2] or the algorithm RC4 [15] used in SSL, WEP and Microsoft
Word and Excel. From a short secret key (known only by the two interested par-
ties) and a public algorithm (the sequence generator), a stream cipher procedure
is based on the generation of a long sequence of seemingly random bits. Such a
sequence is called the keystream sequence. For the encryption, the sender com-
putes the bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) operation among the bits of the original
message or plaintext and the keystream sequence. The result is the ciphertext
to be sent. For the decryption, the receiver generates the same keystream, com-
putes the same bitwise XOR operation between the received ciphertext and the
keystream sequence and obtains again the original message.
Most keystream generators are based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LF-
SRs) [8], which are linear structures characterized by their length (the number of
memory cells), their characteristic polynomial (the feedback function) and their
initial state (the seed or key of the cryptosystem). If the characteristic polyno-
mial is a primitive polynomial [14], then LFSRs generate Pseudo-Noise sequences
(PN-sequences) with good characteristics of pseudorandomness. For a survey on
recurring sequences, primitive LFSRs, and PN -sequences, the interested reader
is referred to [8]. In stream cipher procedures, the PN-sequences are combined by
means of nonlinear functions in order to produce keystream sequences of crypto-
graphic application. Combinational generators, nonlinear filters, clock-controlled
generators, irregularly decimated generators ... are just some of the most popular
nonlinear sequence generators. All of them produce keystreams with high linear
complexity, long period and good statistical properties (see [6] and [3]).
Most cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known plaintext
hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct access to a
portion of the keystream sequence (intercepted sequence). From the intercepted
bits, the attacker has to deduce the cryptosystem key. Once the key is known,
as the sequence generator is public, the whole keystream sequence can be recon-
structed. The complexity of this attack is always compared with that of the key
exhaustive search. If the former complexity is lesser, then the cryptosystem is
said to be broken.
This work focuses on a particular kind of stream ciphers based on LFSRs:
the class of shrinking generators. They are made out of two LFSRs and an irreg-
ular decimation. Shrinking generators have been thoroughly analyzed in several
papers such as [17], [13] and [4]. Nevertheless, we present a new and efficient
cryptanalytic attack requiring much lesser amount of intercepted bits than that
of the previous attacks. The basic idea of this cryptanalysis consists in defining
the output sequence of a shrinking generator as an interleaved sequence (see [9]
and [12]). The characteristics of the interleaved sequences reveal weaknesses that
lead to practical attacks. In addition, we conjecture that these weaknesses can be
extended to all interleaved sequence generators with application in cryptography.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the description and char-
acteristics of the shrinking generator are introduced. Interleaved configuration
and related results are developed in section 3. A cryptanalytic attack against
the shrinking generator that exploits the condition of interleaved sequence is
presented in section 4, while the generalization of this technique to other cryp-
tographic interleaved generators appears in section 5. Finally, conclusions in
section 6 end the paper.
2 The Shrinking Generator
The Shrinking Generator is a pseudorandom number generator based on a non-
linear combination of the recurring sequences produced by two LFSRs. It was
first introduced by Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour at Crypto’93, see [5].
This construction uses two sources of pseudorandom bits to create a third source
of potentially better quality than the original ones. Here quality means difficulty
of predicting a pseudorandom sequence. We denote by SRA and SRS the first
and second LFSR, respectively. The first register SRA has length A, character-
istic polynomial PA(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] and its output sequence is denoted by {ai}
(i ≥ 0) with ai ∈ GF (2). The selector register SRS has length S, characteristic
polynomial PS(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] and its output sequence is denoted by {si} (i ≥ 0)
with si ∈ GF (2). In addition, the lengths of both registers A, S are relatively
prime (A,S) = 1, the characteristic polynomials PA(x), PS(x) are primitive
polynomials in GF (2)[x] and the output sequences {ai}, {si} are PN-sequences
of period (2A−1) and (2S −1), respectively. The output sequence of the shrink-
ing generator, the so-called shrunken sequence denoted by {zj} (j ≥ 0) with
zj ∈ GF (2), is a sub-sequence of {ai} whose terms are chosen according to the
positions of ’1’ bits in the sequence {si}. More precisely, the decimation rule is
defined such as follows:
1. If si = 1 =⇒ zj = ai
2. If si = 0 =⇒ ai is discarded.
As different pairs of SRA/SRS initial states can generate the same shrunken
sequence, in the sequel we assume that the first term of the sequence {si} equals
1, that is s0 = 1.
According to [5], the period of the shrunken sequence is:
T = (2A − 1) · 2(S−1), (1)
its linear complexity, notated LC, satisfies the following inequality:
A · 2(S−2) < LC ≤ A · 2(S−1), (2)
and its characteristic polynomial is of the form:
Pss(x) = P (x)p (3)
where P (x) is an A-degree primitive polynomial in GF (2)[x] and p is an integer
in the interval 2(S−2) < p ≤ 2(S−1). Moreover, it can be proved [16] that the
shrunken sequence has also good distributional statistics. Therefore, this scheme
has been traditionally used as keystream sequence generator with application in
secret-key cryptography.
3 Interleaved Configuration
The (2A − 1) · 2(S−1) bits of a period of any shrunken sequence {zj} can be
arranged into a (2A−1) ·2(S−1) matrix that we will call interleaved configuration
and will denote by IC. In fact,
IC =

z0 z1 z2 . . . z2(S−1)−1
z2(S−1) z2(S−1)+1 z2(S−1)+2 . . . z2·2(S−1)−1
z2·2(S−1) z2·2(S−1)+1 z2·2(S−1)+2 . . . z3·2(S−1)−1
z3·2(S−1) z3·2(S−1)+1 z3·2(S−1)+2 . . . z4·2(S−1)−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
z(2A−2)·2(S−1) z(2A−2)·2(S−1)+1 z(2A−2)·2(S−1)+2 . . . z(2A−1)·2(S−1)−1

Now the following result allows one to identify each element of the matrix
IC with the corresponding term of the sequence {ai}.
Theorem 1. The interleaved configuration matrix IC can be written in terms
of the elements of the sequence {ai} such as follows: IC =

ao0 ao1 ao2 . . . ao(2(S−1)−1)
a(2S−1)+o0 a(2S−1)+o1 a(2S−1)+o2 . . . a(2S−1)+o(2(S−1)−1)
a2·(2S−1)+o0 a2·(2S−1)+o1 a2· (2S−1)+o2 . . . a2· (2S−1)+o(2(S−1)−1)
a3·(2S−1)+o0 a3·(2S−1)+o1 a3·(2S−1)+o2 . . . a3· (2S−1)+o(2(S−1)−1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a(2A−2)·(2S−1)+o0 a(2A−2)·(2S−1)+o1 a(2A−2)·(2S−1)+o2 . . . a(2A−2)·(2S−1)+o(2(S−1)−1)

where the additive sub-indices oj (j = 0, 1, . . . , 2(S−1) − 1) depend on the bits of
the sequence {si} in the following way: if si = 1, then the corresponding sub-
index oj equals the sub-index i, oj = i. All the sub-indices are taken module
2A − 1, which is the period of the sequence {ai}.
Proof. Since the period of the PN-sequence {si} is (2S − 1), the number
of bits with value ’1’ in a period is exactly 2(S−1), and all the elements of any
column of IC come from the same term si = 1 of the PN-sequence, the above
expression for the matrix IC in terms of the elements of {ai} is obtained. 2
Note that according to the assumption s0 = 1, the sub-index o0 = 0. Next,
the following result analyzes the characteristics of the columns of the matrix IC.
Theorem 2. The sequences {dj} = {ak+oj : k = 0, (2S−1), 2·(2S−1), . . . , (2A−
2) ·(2S−1)} (j = 0, 1, . . . , 2(S−1)−1) corresponding to the columns of the matrix
IC are shifted versions of a unique PN-sequence whose characteristic polynomial
is given by:
PD(x) = (x+ αN )(x+ α2·N )(x+ α2
2·N ) . . . (x+ α2
(A−1)·N ),
where N is an integer defined as N = 20 + 21 + . . .+ 2(S−1) and α ∈ GF (2A) a
root of the primitive polynomial PA(x).
Proof. Every sequence {d j} corresponding to the j-th column of IC is a
regular decimation of the PN-sequence {ai}. More precisely, such a sequence is
obtained by taking one out of (2S − 1) terms in {ai}. The primality of A and S
guarantees the primality of (2A−1) and (2S−1). Thus, the decimated sequence
{d j} is also a PN-sequence. In addition, as every {d j} has been obtained from
{ai} with a decimation ratio of value (2S−1), then its characteristic polynomial
PD(x) is the polynomial of the cyclotomic coset (2S − 1) in the Galois Field
GF (2A) generated by the roots of the polynomial PA(x), see [4]. The starting
point of each {d j} is given by the corresponding sub-index oj. 2
4 Cryptanalytic Attack on the Shrinking Generator
The cryptanalytic attack consists in the computation of the initial states of both
registers SRA and SRS. From some known bits of the shrunken sequence we
have to determine the first A bits (a0, a1, . . . , aA−1) of the sequence {ai} (initial
state of SRA) as well as the first S bits (s0, s1, . . . , sS−1) of the sequence {si}
(initial state of SRS). The number of bits needed for the cryptanalysis is at most
(A x S) bits, what is a minimum amount of shrunken sequence compared with
the value of its linear complexity given by the equation (2). Nevertheless, these
bits must be located at very particular positions inside the shrunken sequence. In
fact, the needed bits are exclusively those ones located at the top-left corner (A
x S) sub-matrix of IC. Remark that the bits required for the cryptanalysis are
not all consecutive, since between two successive rows of the sub-matrix there
are a great number of shrunken sequence bits (as many as (2(S−1) − S)) whose
knowledge is useless. The generation of the needed bits is straightly related with
the register state succession. Indeed, each row of this sub-matrix is a portion of
the shrunken sequence starting at the following register states:
– The same initial state of SRS.
– An initial state of SRA shifted 2S − 1 states from that one that generated
the previous row of the sub-matrix.
The procedure is repeated systematically for every row of the sub-matrix. Clearly,
the first row of the sub-matrix is generated from the initial states of SRA and
SRS. After these considerations, this cryptanalytic attack can be divided into
two different steps. In the first one, the computation of the initial state of SRA is
carried out. In the second step and based on the SRA initial state, we determine
the corresponding initial state of the register SRS.
4.1 Computation of the SRA Initial State
Previously to the computation of the initial state, the following result is intro-
duced.
Lemma 1. Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A succes-
sive elements of any column of IC, the remaining bits of such a column can be
determined.
Proof. Theorem 2 defines PD(x), that is the characteristic polynomial of the
PN-sequence corresponding to every column of IC. Thus, knowing A successive
bits of any column and its characteristic polynomial, the linear recurrence rela-
tionship allows one to compute any of the remaining bits of such a PN -sequence.
2
Now the computation of the SRA initial state is described in the next result.
Theorem 3. Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A succes-
sive elements of the first column of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register
SRA can be determined.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that the knowledge of: i) A successive elements of the first
column of IC and ii) its linear recurrence relationship, allows one to generate
any other bit of such a column. On the other hand, from Theorem 1 we know
that the (n+ 1)-th element of the first column of IC corresponds to an· (2S−1),
that is to say the (n · (2S − 1) + 1)-th term of the PN -sequence generated by
the register SRA. Consequently, we first solve the following system of modular
equations in the unknowns ni
ni · (2S − 1) ≡ i mod (2A − 1) (i = 0, 1, . . . , (A− 1)),
and then, making use of the linear recurrence relationship, we compute the
elements of the first column of IC at the positions (ni+1)-th (i = 0, 1, . . . , (A−
1)). Such elements correspond to a0, a1, . . . , aA−1, respectively. 2
4.2 Computation of the SRS Initial State
The computation of the SRS initial state is described in the next result.
Theorem 4. Given A·S bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to the top-
left corner (A x S) sub-matrix of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register
SRS can be determined.
Proof. Firstly, from the linear recurrence relationship and theorem 3, we can
compute (A− 1) blocks of A consecutive bits, Bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , (A− 1)), starting
each of them at the (ni + 1)-th (i = 1, 2, . . . , (A− 1)) bit of the first column of
IC, respectively.
SUBIC =

a0 ao1 . . . ao(S−1)
a2S−1 a(2S−1)+o1 . . . a(2S−1)+o(S−1)
a2· (2S−1) a2·(2S−1)+o1 . . . a2·(2S−1)+o(S−1)
a3·(2S−1) a3·(2S−1)+o1 . . . a3·(2S−1)+o(S−1)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
a(A−1)·(2S−1) a(A−1)·(2S−1)+o1 . . . a(A−1)·(2S−1)+o(S−1)

Secondly, since the sequence in every column of IC is exactly the same but
starting at different points given by aoj , we compare each block Bi with the
corresponding column of the sub-matrix of IC. As soon as a coincidence is
found the sub-index oj is univocally determined, that is oj = i. In addition,
each sub-index oj indicates the position of the (j + 1)-th 1 in the initial state
of SRS while the intermediate bits are 0’s. Thus, the above procedure can be
repeated for j = 1, 2, · · · till we get oj ≥ (S − 1). In this way, the initial state of
the register SRS is thoroughly determined. 2
4.3 An illustrative example
Let us consider a shrinking generator characterized by:
1. SRA with length A = 5, characteristic polynomial PA(x) = x5 + x4 + x3 +
x2 + 1 and output sequence {ai}.
2. SRS with length S = 4, characteristic polynomial PS(x) = x4 + x3 + 1 and
output sequence {si}.
3. The characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence is Pss(x) = PD(x)p
= (x5 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1)8.
Given 20 bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to a (5 x 4) sub-matrix of
IC
SUBIC =

1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
 ,
we can launch a cryptanalytic attack against the shrinking generator in order to
obtain the initial states of both LFSRs. Table 1 shows the calculations carried
out for cryptanalyzing the above described generator. The most left column
represents the indices ni numbered (0, 1, . . . , 2A − 2 = 30). Next column shows
from Theorem 1 the position of the terms (a0, a1, . . . , a4) of the sequence {ai}
regarding the first column {d0} of the matrix IC. The following columns of
the Table 1 represent the matrix IC: in boldface the left-corner (5 x 4) sub-
matrix with the known bits, the remaining bits of {d0} are the bits computed
to determine the initial states of SRA and SRS, and the symbol − corresponds
to unknown bits of the shrunken sequence that do not need to be computed for
the cryptanalysis.
Computation of the SRA initial state: According to Theorem 3, we compute
the positions of the (ni+1)-th elements of the first column of IC by solving the
equation system
ni · 15 ≡ i mod 31 (i = 0, 1, . . . , 4),
That is, n0 = 0, n1 = 29, n2 = 27, n3 = 25, n4 = 23. Then, by means of
the characteristic polynomial PD(x) we determine the values of the (ni + 1)-th
(i = 0, 1, . . . , 4) elements of the first column {d0} of IC. This is just a backward
application of the linear recurrence relationship to the first column of the sub-
matrix of IC, that is an+5 = an+3 + an+2 + an+1 + an with n ≥ 30. In fact, we
get, a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 1, a4 = 1, see Table 1. Therefore, the initial
state of the register SRA (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) has been determined.
Computation of the SRS initial state: According to Theorem 4, we compute
the relative shifts between consecutive columns in the matrix IC:
- Computation of o1: We know a1 at the (29+1)-th position of the first column
{d0} and compute its S − 1 = 4 successive bits. We compare this block of
5 bits B1 = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) with the the second column {d1} of the sub-matrix
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0)′, see Table 1 . There is coincidence, thus o1 = 1.
- Computation of o2:We know a2 at the (27+1)-th position of the {d0} and com-
pute its 4 successive bits. We compare this block of 5 bits B2 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
with the third column {d2} of the sub-matrix (1, 0, 0, 1, 0)′. There is no coin-
cidence, thus we analyze the following bit a3. We know a3 at the (25+ 1)-th
position of {d0} and compute its 4 successive bits. We compare this block
of 5 bits B3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) with the third column {d2} of the sub-matrix
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0)′, see Table 1. There is coincidence, thus o2 = 3.
Table 1. Matrix IC corresponding to the described shrinking generator
ni {ai} d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7
0 a0 1 0 1 1 − − − −
1 1 0 0 1 − − − −
2 0 1 0 1 − − − −
3 0 1 1 1 − − − −
4 0 0 0 1 − − − −
5 − − − − − − − −
6 − − − − − − − −
7 − − − − − − − −
8 − − − − − − − −
9 − − − − − − − −
10 − − − − − − − −
11 − − − − − − − −
12 − − − − − − − −
13 − − − − − − − −
14 − − − − − − − −
15 − − − − − − − −
16 − − − − − − − −
17 − − − − − − − −
18 − − − − − − − −
19 − − − − − − − −
20 − − − − − − − −
21 − − − − − − − −
22 − − − − − − − −
23 a4 1 − − − − − − −
24 − − − − − − − −
25 a3 1 − − − − − − −
26 0 − − − − − − −
27 a2 0 − − − − − − −
28 1 − − − − − − −
29 a1 0 − − − − − − −
30 0 − − − − − − −
Since o2 = 3 ≥ S − 1, we have determined the initial state of SRS. In fact,
s0 = 1, o1 = 1 implies s1 = 1, o2 = 3 implies s2 = 0 and s3 = 1. Therefore, the
SRS initial state is (s0, s1, s2, s3) = (1, 1, 0, 1). Remark that only the knowledge
of three columns of the sub-matrix has been necessary to identify the initial state
of SRS. Indeed, the number of columns needed equals the number of ’1’ bits
in the initial state of the selector register. The maximum number of known bits
corresponds to SRS initial state with all bits ’1’. In the remaining cases, less
bits are sufficient.
Once the initial states of both register are determined, the whole shrunken
sequence that is the keystream sequence can be computed.
5 Generalization of this Technique to Interleaved
Sequences
First of all, we introduce the general definition of interleaved sequence [12].
Definition 1. Let f(x) be a polynomial over GF (q) of degree r and let m be
a positive integer. For any sequence {uk} over GF (q), we write k = i · m + j
with (i = 0, 1, . . . ) and (j = 0, . . . , m − 1). If every sub-sequence {uj} of {uk}
defined as {ui ·m+j} is generated by f(x), then the sequence {uk} is called an
interleaved sequence over GF (q) of size m associated with the polynomial f(x).
Table 2 shows the interleaved sequence {uk} over GF (2) associated with the
3-degree characteristic polynomial f(x) = x3+x+1 over GF (2) and size m = 4.
Reading by rows, the interleaved sequence is {uk} = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0} while by columns the sequence is made out
of {uj} (j = 0, . . . , 3) four shifted versions of the PN -sequence generated by
f(x).
Table 2. Interleaved sequence with 4 shifted versions of the same PN -sequence
u0 u1 u2 u3
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
Interleaved sequences are currently used as keystream sequences with appli-
cation in cryptography. See the introduction of [9] and the types of keystream
sequences enumerated there. They can be generated in different ways:
1. By a LFSR controlled by another LFSR (which may be the same one)
e.g. multiplexed sequences [11], clock-controlled sequences [1], cascaded se-
quences [7], shrinking generator sequences [5] etc.
2. By one or more than one LFSR and a feed-forward nonlinear function e.g.
Gold-sequence family, Kasami (small and large set) sequence families, GMW
sequences, Klapper sequences, No sequences etc. See [9] and the references
cited therein.
In brief, a large number of well-known cryptographic sequences are included in
the class of interleaved sequences. Next, the link between interleaved sequences
and shrunken sequences is expressed in the following result.
Theorem 5. Shrunken sequences are interleaved sequences of size 2(S−1).
Proof. Let {zk} be a shrunken sequence with characteristic polynomial P (x)p
where P (x) is an A-degree primitive polynomial and p is an integer in the interval
2(S−2) < p ≤ 2(S−1). According to the interleaved configuration IC, we may
express {zk} in terms of m sequences {z j} where {z j} = {zi ·m+j} with i ≥ 0,
m = 2(S−1) and (j = 0, . . . , m − 1). Since by Theorem 2 the sequences {z j}
are generated by the same characteristic polynomial PD(x), we get that the
shrunken sequence {zk} is an interleaved sequence of size 2(S−1) associated with
the polynomial PD(x). 2
The previous theorem proves that shrunken sequences are interleaved se-
quences. Moreover, section 4 shows that the knowledge of a number of bits of
the shrunken sequence allows one to lauch a cryptanalytic attack against the
shrinking generator. As many cryptographic sequence generators produce inter-
leaved sequences, then the previous considerations take us into the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 1. Given a number of bits corresponding to an initial sub-matrix
of the interleaved configuration IC of an interleaved sequence, it is possible to
obtain the whole interleaved sequence.
The confirmation of this conjecture would prove the weakness of interleaved
generators for cryptographic purposes.
6 Conclusions
In this work, a new cryptanalytic attack against the class of shrinking generators
has been proposed. The amount of intercepted bits necessary to realize such an
attack is much lesser than that of other standard cryptanalysis. The basic idea
consists in defining the shrunken sequence as an interleaved sequence. Hence the
weaknesses inherent to interleaved sequences can be advantageously used in the
practical attack. A direct consequence of this technique is its generalization to
other interleaved sequence generators of cryptographic purpose. In this way, the
security of this kind of generators must be carefully checked.
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